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The establishment in short succession of a series of non-partisan caretaker 
governments in European democracies such as Greece and Italy in 2010-2012 
sparked a new wave of academic interest in short-term technocratic administrations, 
which seem to be recurring phenomenon. Different streams in the emerging literature 
have considered how technocratic or technocrat-led governments can best be defined 
and typologised; why and how they formed; and if and how their occurrence is part of 
a broader malaise of democracy in Europe.1 However, although such governments 
have sometimes been long-lasting and the default assumption often that they are or 
should be seen as illegitimate and democratically dysfunctional, there has thus been 
little consideration of if and how they legitimate themselves to mass publics. This 
question is particularly acute given that empirically caretaker technocrat-led 
administrations have been clustered in newer, more crisis-prone democracies of 
Southern and Eastern Europe where weaker bureaucratic traditions and high levels of 
state exploitation by political parties suggest a weak basis for any government claiming 
technocratic impartiality. 
In this paper, using Michael Saward’s framework of democratic politics as the making 
of ‘representative claims’, I re-examine the case of one of Europe’s longer-lasting and 
most popular technocratic administrations, the 2009-10 Fischer government in the 
Czech Republic to consider how a technocratic government in a newer European 
democracy can make seemingly successful claims to legitimacy despite unfavourable 
background conditions. The paper is structured as follows.  It first notes how 
discussion of technocratic governments, has largely taken place through – and been 
overshadowed by -  the literature on democratic party government. It then presents 
Saward’s framework of ‘representative claims’ and relates Richard Katz’s ideas about 
the ‘legitimising myth’ of party government in Western democracies and ideas from 
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the technocracy literature to Saward’s framework. The article next turns to examine 
the question empirically. It notes the potentially paradoxical position of technocratic 
governments in newer European democracies and presents the 2009-10 Fischer 
government in the Czech Republic as a case typifying the circumstances in which 
technocratic caretaker governments emerge, but outlying in its popularity and 
apparent legitimacy. The paper examines the representative claims made for and by 
the Fischer government during its term in office, which are found to offer a novel and, 
to some extent, conflicting set of public rationales for its legitimacy. The paper reflects 
on these findings and draws conclusions for future research on technocratic and party 
governments using claims-making frameworks. 
 
Technocrat administrations through the prism of party government  
Political scientists and democratic theorists have themselves taken normative stances 
on if and how technocratic governments erode democracy.2  However, the question of 
how they are legitimised to mass publics in empirical settings has remained 
un(der)studied and, where it is touched on, heavily filtered through debates about party 
government. Echoing an older set of concerns voiced in 1960s,3 political scientists 
initially viewed the emergence of administrations of technocrats in Southern Europe in 
2011-12 with dismay, see them  as signalling the accelerated erosion of democracy in 
the crisis conditions produced by the Great Recession and the fiscal pressures of 
Eurozone membership. Technocratic administrations threatened democracy both 
directly by substituting unelected officials for elected party politicians and in the longer 
term by potentially fuelling an anti-party or populist backlash.4 The (implicit) 
assumption in such commentaries was that technocratic governments - especially if 
implementing painful reforms - would be received by mass publics as illegitimate forms 
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of cross-party collusion, that is an attempt by parties to deny democratic choice, evade 
government responsibility and avoid accountability.  
Subsequent assessments, however, noted that despite these high profile Southern 
European cases, caretaker technocrat governments in contemporary Europe 
remained an empirically rare phenomenon, infrequently punctuating long periods of 
‘normal’ party government.5 ‘Full’ technocratic governments without any party 
politicians were rarer still. Technocratic caretaker administrations were, moreover, 
invariably appointed within normal constitutional procedures by parties or elected 
presidents; relied on the support (or least acquiescence) of party-based legislatures 
to assume office; and worked on the basis of mandates defined and circumscribed by 
elected politicians.6 In this perspective, technocratic caretaker governments were seen 
as an episodic emanation of party-based democracy, trouble-shooting short-term 
difficulties in government formation, and needed no legitimation beyond that attaching 
to parties.  If there was a problem with technocratic governments (and other forms of 
delegating to experts), it was likely a side-effect of parties’ own declining legitimacy as 
their social and organisational roots eroded in fragmented post-industrial societies and 
they struggled to articulate or implement policy alternatives in an increasingly 
globalised post-Cold War world.7  
Even when themselves the subject of direct empirical study, technocratic governments 
have largely been largely defined by what they are not and subsumed into notions of 
non-partisanship or non-party government.   In their widely cited typology McDonnell 
and Valbruzzi, for example, argue that technocratic government should be understood 
as a “reverse mirror image” of Richard Katz’s classic definition of party government, 
that is as a context where policy is not set or enacted by parties and political decisions 
not made by elected party representatives.8  Similarly, other than being non-partisan, 
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a technocrat-minister had merely be ‘said to possess recognized non-party political 
expertise which is directly relevant to the role occupied in government’.9  While Katz’s 
seminal essay argued that the ideal type of party government – resting on the idea of 
chain of democratic delegation from voter to party, and from party to government -  
also functioned  normatively and more publicly (in cruder former) as ‘the dominant 
legitimising myth of European democracies’, it was unclear, what a “reverse mirror 
image” view of technocratic governments implies about their claims to legitimacy.   
 
Legitimising claims for party and non-party governments 
This is a puzzling omission. Technocrat-led caretaker governments are among the 
most advanced forms of power-sharing between elected politicians and technocrats in 
European democracies.10 There is, moreover, a distinct and well established body of 
scholarship on technocrats and technocracy, which examines their origins and nature 
and deals precisely the distinct political appeal(s) they make, usually based on notions 
of neutral expertise or specialist knowledge.11 However, its reference points are 
diverse, taking in a range of historical, regional and institutional settings. 
Such diverging claims to legitimacy may be usefully approached through the 
‘representative claim’ framework of Michael Saward, which is flexible enough to 
accommodate the claims of elected and unelected actors across a range of (non-) 
institutional and cultural contexts, and whose ‘dynamic’ view of representation makes 
it well suited to study politically unconventional episodes such as technocratic 
governments.  As several scholars have noted, it is also pertinent to more enduring 
phenomena such as parties or populist movements.12 
Saward sees actors in democratic politics as making ongoing, shifting sets of 
competing (and overlapping) ‘representative claims’ to legitimately exercise power on 
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behalf of others. Representation is thus “a dynamic quality of political life spread 
unevenly across societies, taking in a range of ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors and 
organizations”, rather than (just) a fixed institutional relationship.13 A representation 
claim, he explains, is “an act whereby a maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a 
subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is 
offered to an audience (‘A’)”.14 The ‘object’ is the constituency depicted in 
representative claim, the ‘referent’ the real-life individuals the claim refers to, and the) 
‘audience’ those who may recognise and accepted the claim and hence be 
represented. Democratic legitimacy for Saward is thus perceived legitimacy, the 
acceptance of a representative claim an appropriate constituency in an open society 
in which citizens can freely weigh competing claims.15 What Katz terms the legitimising 
‘myth of party government’ can be viewed as a set of elective (electorally-based) 
representative claims staked for parties (subject) as representing certain people 
(referent) based on depictions of them as a particular electoral or social constituency 
(object) based on the notion of voters delegating authority to accountable 
representatives (organised into parties) in line with the result of competitive elections.16   
The precise form of elective claims made for parties – and the nature of the 
constituencies they invoke -  varies by individual party and national or historical 
context,17 and, as Katz notes, may also bear little resemblance to more complex 
empirical realities of liberal-democratic polities.18 If long-established and well 
embedded parties may benefit from what Saward terms or “sedimented representative 
claims”, that is“... broad legitimacy of political institutions and distribution of political 
authority [which] in a sense makes the claims for them’.19   
However, Saward sees (democratic) ‘representation’ in more expansive terms than 
simply electoral mandates.  He argues that there are a range of non-elective 
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‘representative claims’ which are potentially legitimate and democratic. This implies, 
firstly, that parties and elected politicians can (and do) boost their legitimacy with 
additional non-elective claims (for example, regarding their local or historical roots).20 
However, it also implies that there are a wide range of unelected actors may be able 
make legitimate ‘representative claims’, filling in gaps that elective representation 
cannot fill: they may claim to be representative because they share characteristics or 
experiences with those represented  (descriptive representation or ‘mirroring’); they 
may thus claim to represent higher or enduring interests rooted in, culture, morality or 
tradition, that parties (by definition partial and partisan) may struggle to articulate; they 
may stake claims based on scale of mass mobilisation or mass membership; on 
notions of ‘stakeholding’; or on the moral imperative of speaking up for unheard or 
unvoiced interests. They may ‘represent’ constituencies aesthetically or performatively 
simply by offering portrayals and depictions of them which ring true to their intended 
audience. 21  
Although highly varied, unelected actors’ claims, Saward argues, are likely to be 
credible to audiences if they fit two broad (and somewhat opposed) criteria: if they (1) 
show their subjects as embedded in a legitimate constitutional or institutional context, 
for example, as part of the chain of democratic delegation, or with sufficient 
“connectedness”  to  bathe in the ‘reflected glow of electoral process’  or (2) if the claim 
made allows the claimant to be viewed as independent “unbeholden to other interests, 
genuine in their convictions, and owing nothing troubling in terms of money or backing 
to others – .... [carrying] an air of “untaintedness.”22 In a contemporary European 
context, technocratic caretaker governments’ claims appear likely to be split and 
positioned mid-way. As the product of legal or constitutional process they can claim 
embeddedness in a wider democratic order, stressing that their interim status makes 
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short-term departure from the norm, and – as usually appointed or supported by 
elected politicians – they can claim to be the final link in the chain of democratic 
delegation.  
Conversely, they may also be able make representative claims based on 
independence and disinterestedness. Although divided over a range of issues, the 
technocracy literature agrees that technocrats’ claim to rule proclaimed ability to 
provide a superior quality of governance by better identifying and providing for the 
public interest through the use rational or scientific knowledge. Technocrats have also 
historically  background or outlook insulates them from competing sectional or partisan 
interests, allowing them to act rationally in the public interest.23 In Saward’s terms, we 
may thus anticipate claims asserting that governing technocrats (subject) represent all 
citizens (referent) by act for the public, the nation or society as whole (object), 
protecting “the enduring or persisting  interests of the state against incursion or 
corruption by the politics of the moment”.24  
   
The paradox of technocratic government in newer democracies 
We now turn to examine representative claims-making by technocratic caretaker 
governments in concrete empirical context.  Technocratic caretaker governments in 
contemporary Europe have overwhelmingly emerged in newer democracies in the 
South and East of the continent.25 Indeed, perhaps additionally reflecting the role of 
national institutional provisions such as restrictive conditions for early dissolution of 
parliament,26 the bulk of such technocratic non-party governments have occurred in 
only seven countries, all of which experienced repeat episodes of technocratic  
caretaker government: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Finland, Greece, Portugal 
and Romania.   Of these, five can be unambiguously classed as newer ‘Third Wave’ 
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democracies. Together they account for 18 of 24 cases listed in McDonnell and 
Valbruzzi’s dataset. If later cases are added (to end 2016), this becomes 22 of 29.27 
Such clustering is unsurprising. Newer Southern and Eastern European democracies 
are poorer and more peripheral in the wider European economy – and hence more 
vulnerable to economic shocks -  and have less well-established, but often more 
clientelistic and corrupt party systems. Moreover, parties in post-communist Eastern 
Europe have from the outset been ‘hollow’ state-centred formations with weak social 
roots, low memberships and limited institutionalisation,28 which, to use Saward’s terms 
may not ‘sedimented representation’ long established parties in older democracies 
enjoy. Survey evidence confirms that newer European democracies exhibit greater 
levels of public distrust in the functioning of (electorally-based) representative 
institutions and greater public receptiveness to the idea of technocratic governance as 
an alternative than in core West European states.29  
This pattern, however, raises a sharp paradox: namely, that the demand for 
technocratic government is highest in those precisely in those European democracies, 
which are least well equipped to supply it.  The state apparatus and public 
administration in Southern and Eastern Europe democracies have proved markedly 
more subject to politicisation and exploitation by parties than those of core West 
European states  – reflecting the historical sequencing of mass democratisation before 
the formation of a professionalised state administration and the legacies of 
authoritarian rule.30 This suggests a relative absence of technocrats and officials who 
can credibly assume the role of non-partisan governors because of a blurred boundary 
between party politicians and non-partisan technocrats. Technocratic administrations 
in newer European democracies may struggle for legitimacy and may be as crisis-
ridden as the party governments they replace. Indeed, such scenarios have already 
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played out in stark terms in Eastern Europe: the ostensibly technocratic administration 
of Plamen Oresharski in Bulgaria in 2013, for example, saw an intensification of the 
instability and mass protests that had brought down the preceding party-based 
administration and Oresharski was itself eventually forced from office in a similar 
way.31  
 
The case of the Fischer government  
However, this has been far from always the case. Some technocratic caretaker 
administrations in Europe’s newer democracies have had high and enduring levels of 
popularity.  The technocratic government of Jan Fischer in the Czech Republic (April 
2009 - July 2010) offers a strong case in point.  It was, after the Monti government in 
Italy, the longest serving caretaker technocrat administration in Europe since the onset 
of the Great Recession in 2008,32 as well as one of small minority of such 
administrations that can to use McDonnell and Valbruzzi’s term be classed as a ‘full 
technocratic government’: that is, as a government composed entirely of non-party 
technocrat ministers with a remit extending beyond very short-term ‘minding the 
shop’.33  The Fischer government also enjoyed exceptionally high levels of popularity. 
Despite implementing an austerity budget, Fischer and his administration enjoyed far 
higher levels of approval and trust than Czechia’s two other technocrat-led 
governments: the short-lived administration of Josef Tošovský (January- July 1998) 
and the longer-lived government of Jiří Rusnok (2013- 2014) appointed without the 
prior agreement of any of the country’s parliamentary parties.34 Indeed, Fischer’s 
approval ratings make him by some margin the popular prime minister in the history 
of the independent Czech Republic and, judged on peak levels of public trust and 
satisfaction, his administration its most popular government.35 The Fischer 
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government’s approval ratings were also higher and more buoyant than those of 
similarly long-lasting ‘fully technocratic’ European governments such as the (2011-13) 
Monti government in Italy, which declined after an initial honeymoon period or the 
(2015-16) Cioloș administration in Romania, which fluctuated, but peaked at 46 per 
cent .36 
 
The Czech Republic as a typifying case  
In other respects, however, the Czech Republic exhibits features common to other 
newer European democracies which have experienced multiple episodes of 
technocratic government. Party government was stable and well established, but 
anchored in an exploitative relationship with the state. Since its consolidation in 1992-
6, the Czech party system had seen the continual parliamentary presence of two large 
parties the centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Czech Social Democrats 
(ČSSD), and two minor parties, the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak 
People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) and the Communists (KSČM). Parties had a 
constitutionally privileged role and  had quickly established themselves as dominant 
actors, fully controlling the legislative process and exercising an effective ‘power 
monopoly’ despite generally low memberships and poor levels of social implantation:37  
Party governments featured few independent ministers -  Katsunori and Williams’s 
data suggests only 13.4% between 1992 and 200938 Parties– or individual party 
politicians– also exercised powerful patronage over the appointment of top-level 
officials in key state institutions and agencies, exploiting the lack of delineated career 
structures and norms in the civil service to operate a system of so-called trafika: the 
use of high-level partisan appointments to managerial posts in ministries, public bodies 
and state-owned companies to reward supporters and enhance their own political 
11 
 
control of the state apparatus.39 As in other European democracies with recurrent 
technocratic caretaker administrations, restrictive conditions for early dissolution of 
parliament narrowed politicians’ options following government collapse.  In the Czech 
case, the Constitution set high barriers to early dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies 
(lower house), which was allowed only in narrowly defined sets of circumstances and 
could not be initiated by a defeated government.40 
The immediate origins of Fischer administration lay in finely balanced political situation 
between left and right following the 2006 election -  a (then) recurring feature of the 
Czech party system which made the formation of  ideologically coherent majority 
coalitions difficult - 41 and tensions between left and right over austerity as the Great 
Recession took hold in 2008-9. On 24 March 2009, the liberal centre-right minority 
Civic Democrat-Christian Democrat-Green coalition of prime minister Miroslav 
Topolánek, which had taken office in January 2007 after months of post-election 
manoeuvring, narrowly lost a vote of no confidence. Topolánek’s government had 
been hampered from the outset by its lack of a reliable parliamentary majority and 
faced repeated motions of no confidence, finally losing office when four former 
coalition deputies joined opposition deputies in voting against the government. 
This implied an interim period during which parties would need to agree either to stage 
one of the dissolution scenarios envisaged by the Constitution or to pass new 
constitutional legislation enabling dissolution.  Accordingly, the leaders of the two 
largest parties, outgoing ODS prime minister Topolánek and opposition Social 
Democrat leader Jiří Paroubek, quickly agreed on a caretaker government of non-
political figures for a short-period while the Czech EU presidency concluded (on 30 
June 2009) and parties passed a one-off constitutional law shortening the 
parliamentary term –  a template previously used to engineer early elections in 1998, 
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when a caretaker government headed by Josef Tošovský, the governor of the central 
bank, had held office for six and a half months following the fall of a previous centre-
right government. On  5 April 2009 leaders of the three parties of the outgoing coalition 
and the opposition Social Democrats signed an agreement to this effect, identifying 
Jan Fischer, the head of the Czech Statistical Office, as the prime minister designate 
of a temporary government of ‘non-party experts’.42   Fischer’s government was 
appointed in full on 8 May 2009, winning a vote of confidence on 9 June. 
The constitutionally problematic status of early dissolution gave Fischer’s caretaker 
government further impetus,  when the Czech Constitutional Court ruled that the  ad 
hoc constitutional law passed to call early parliamentary elections was 
unconstitutional, scrapping early elections planned for October 2009.43 Although 
parties quickly passed a general constitutional amendment creating an additional route 
to early dissolution by parliamentary vote, Social Democrat fears that a further 
constitutional challenge might lead to annulment of early elections result, led them 
unexpectedly to decide that they no longer supported early dissolution.  As this left the 
required three-fifths majority in the Chamber unattainable, the Fischer government 
served an additional five months until scheduled parliamentary elections of 28-29 May 
2010, claiming an extended mandate to pass the state budget and make cuts to meet 
deficit targets,44  finally leaving office on 10 July 2010.  
 
The paradox of technocratic government in the Czech Republic 
The formation of the Fischer government vividly illustrates the difficulties of forming a 
credible technocratic administration in a newer, post-communist democracy. The two 
main party leaders’ choice of Jan Fischer as caretaker prime minister came as a 
surprise.  Unlike the governor of the central bank Josef Tošovský who had headed the 
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previous (1998) technocratic government, Fischer had no public profile and little 
experience of high level politics. In Fischer Topolánek and Paroubek did, however, 
appear to have found a figure who embodied the ideal of the technocratic official.  A 
career statistician who had worked his way up to head the Statistical Office, Fischer 
had never been involved in party politics after 1989, although like many specialists of 
his generation he had joined the Communist Party during the 1980s to smooth his 
career path.  His views as he clarified and developed them in office evinced a clear 
technocratic bias, seeing government as essentially a managerial task with his ideal, 
drawing on his career in the Statistical Office, being that of the career official. The 
discovery in the head of the Czech Statistical Office (ČSÚ) of a prototypical technocrat, 
was however, not entirely fortuitous. The ČSÚ appears to have been one of a number 
of specialised agencies, which functioned relatively freely from political interference – 
seemingly a legacy carried over the late communist period when its appear to have 
been one of a number of technical agencies which functioned as islands of  
bureaucratic autonomy in the communist party-state.45   
However, while Fischer fitted the ideal of the non-party technocrat well, the remaining 
17 non-party ministers in his government presented a more complex picture, 
exemplifying many the difficulties faced by newer democracies seeking credible non-
partisan ministers.  On first examination, like Fischer himself, they conformed closely 
the profile of non-party technocrat. All, like Fischer himself, were not members of a 
political party when they took office and most had public sector administrative 
experience. Of the 21 individuals who served in the government at ministerial level, 
seven were existing ‘deputy ministers’ (náměstky) in the ministries they headed and 
one a former deputy minister46; three (including Fischer) were chief executives of state 
agencies; four were heads of state-owned companies or organisations (the Czech 
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Philharmonic, a large hospital, the Czech national electricity grid (ČEPS), and the 
Czech national tourism agency); two were diplomats or ambassadors; and one was a 
mid-ranking official in the European Commission. Only three might loosely be 
described as coming from civil society backgrounds.47  
However, closer examination of the government’s composition and its ministers’ 
career trajectories and relationships with parties suggests a more complex 
construction. While some ministers also had no previous history of partisan 
engagement, this was some far from the case for all. Approximately one third of the 
21 ministers who served in Fischer ‘s cabinet had been members of or had close and 
active associations with the party that nominated them.48 Those who were party 
members simply resigned their membership on joining the government to meet formal 
criteria of non-partisanship and resumed membership after leaving the government.  
Several had also stood for national elected office for their nominating parties – a fact 
that should disqualify them as technocrats in typologies such as that of McDonnell and 
Valbruzzi - and, although none were front-line politicians, many had pursued on-off 
political careers. Some ministers with this profile were, moreover, among the most 
senior members of the government: foreign minister Jan Kohout, for example, was a 
long-standing member of the Social Democrats (ČSSD) before taking office who later 
re-joined the party and stood (unsuccessfully) as a ČSSD candidate for the Senate in 
2010, while interior Minister Martin Pecina had been a member of ČSSD for four years 
before taking up his post as head of the Czech Competition Authority in 2005 – he was 
later briefly an MP for the party. In shaping (and making nominations to) the Fischer 
government, Czech parties adapted the trafika system and the networks of officials 
with political affiliations in the top echelons of public administration it gave rise to.  
 
15 
 
Representative claims and counter-claims 
Contesting the claims of the Fischer government 
At the outset, it was far from obvious that Fischer’s would be an administration 
breaking records for popularity. The doubtful non-partisan credentials of many of 
Fischer’s ministers were quickly picked up on. Critics – making what were, in effect 
‘unrepresentative claims' questioning the legitimacy of the incoming government - 
called into question whether in fact, its ministers had high-level specialist expertise 
and or the detachment from sectional or partisan interests needed govern well or to 
represent enduring or underlying interests of state.  
The inexperience of Fischer and the ‘semi-political’ background of his key ministers 
were subject to withering criticism by the media and politicians not party to the 
agreement, including some internal critics of Topolánek in his  Civic Democratic Party. 
The editorial of the news magazine Respekt, for example, saw Fischer as ‘… a likable, 
competent official’ whose obscurity would leave him struggling to manage the Czech 
EU Presidency,49 while a columnist for the tabloid Blesk dismissed him as an ‘obliging 
honest Mr Nobody’ whose personality was as dull as his ‘second-rate 1970s suit’.50 
Fischer’s membership of the Communist Party in 1980s was also attacked by some 
commentators who saw it as typical of a morally compromised generation of state 
officials formed in the late communist era, cancelling out whatever other claims to non-
partisanship might be made.51  
While not questioning the technocratic caretaker government’s legality or 
constitutionality,52 other critics rejected any notion of the ‘disinterestedness’ of the 
Fischer government by highlighting its embednessness and connectedness with the 
existing party-political establishment.  Here “connectedness” with established 
constitutional order was not a source of legitimacy as Saward’s discussion of non-
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elective representative claims proposes, but of illegitimacy because of established 
parties’ supposed capture by corrupt vested interests. These critics suggested that 
Fischer’s government was so dominated by the two largest parties that it was no more 
than ‘hidden Grand Coalition’,53 an accusation previously levelled at the highly 
unpopular ‘Opposition Agreement’ confidence-and-supply deal between the 
(governing) Social Democrats and the (opposition) Civic Democrats in 1998-2002.54  
Other commentators conceded that, Fischer’s government might have a degree of 
independence from parties, but argued his administration would be captured by the 
same informal interest groups that had previously penetrated parties and party-based 
governments.55  Given the overlap between politics, business and public 
administration at the heart of the trafika system, several ministers had professional or 
career ties to economic interest groups, as well as parties. There were suggestions 
throughout Fischer’s term of office that potentially corrupt informal relationships 
between government and business were continuing as under previous party 
governments, especially in the field of energy policy.56 How despite such evident 
vulnerabilities did Fischer’s administration win such high levels of support and 
acceptance?  Fischer himself proved an unexpectedly competent head of government, 
both domestically and on the international stage,57 and his administration successfully 
steered several contentious items of legislation through parliament most notably 
(despite unwanted amendments) the December 2009 budget.  It is also true that the 
Czech economy was less severely impacted by the Great Recession than those of 
Southern and South Eastern European states and levels of unemployment and public 
debt were notably lower.58 However, the record approval ratings of Fischer and his 
government achieved at a time of deep recession suggest that there a complex 
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process of legitimation was at work, than simply public approval for a display of 
unexpected political competence.  
 
Applying the representative claim framework 
In a Czech context, the public appeal of alternatives to party government, including 
technocratic governance, has often been analysed by recourse to simple notions of 
political culture or national exceptionalism: that for political-cultural reasons Czech 
society is unusually receptive to anti-political alternatives to party government.59 
Tucker et al, for example, relate the earlier technocrat-led caretaker administration of 
Josef Tošovský in 1998 (backed by president Václav Havel) to a Czech tradition of 
‘non-political politics’ sceptical of conventional party politics, which can be traced back 
through the philosophy of dissident intellectuals of 1980s to the President Masaryk in 
interwar period and, ultimately, to the preeminent role of culture in 19th century nation-
building.60 However, survey-based research undermines the notion that Czech public 
attitudes to parties or technocratic alternatives are strongly marked by political-cultural 
exceptionalism.61 Moreover, both historically and in contemporary Czech politics there 
have been episodes where anti-party projects, or technocratic projects, have met with 
weak public approval, and discourses endorsing parties and democratic party 
government have been in the ascendant.  The institutional and constitutional 
embedding of party government in the Czech Republic from mid-1990s, for example, 
was accompanied by a set of widely diffused normative ideas favouring ‘standard’ 
party-based representation, challenging the views of ex-dissident politicians who 
advocated a model of non-ideological civic consensus and loose, participatory 
movement-parties.62 
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The representative claims approach offers a framework better able to capture both 
dynamic and conflictual nature of politics and the cultural and historical context that 
may inform it. As Saward explains “claim‐making and claim‐reception are deeply 
culturally inflected practices” framed within a “cultural code” or “cultural moment”’, 
which sets bounds on the range of claims accepted as legitimate, but at the same time 
provides ready-mades tropes which can be reinterpreted and re-presented in new 
ways.63 In the Czech context, claims were framed in terms of perceived cultural affinity 
with the West and the notion of strong pre-communist Czech national democratic 
tradition, expressed above all in the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-38), which was 
frequently (if often inaccurately) referenced in debates related to constitutional and 
issues or democratic institutions.64 Politicians advocating “standard”’ parties thus 
argued that they were more democratically representative in offering voters clearer 
choices and lines of accountability - but were also a tried-and-tested West European 
norm culturally appropriate for Czechs, which reconnected with democratic tradition of 
interwar Czechoslovakia. 65 The notion of an anti-party or anti-political culture may 
perhaps be better as reconceptualised in terms of the (greater) “cultural availability of 
resources for claims” for or against party government.66  
 
Representative claims for the Fischer government  
Turning to apply the claims-making framework directly to the Fischer government 
directly, we find that we can identify three overlapping representative claims that 
emerge in politicians’ statements and media commentary. These (re-)emerge at key 
points in the life of the government: in the war of words which blew up in April-May 
2009 about how the incoming administration should be labelled; after its term (and 
mandate) were extended following the Constitutional Court ruling of September 2009; 
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and, towards the end of its term when politicians and commentators weighed up its 
record.  Two of these are in line with the earlier discussion mapping party government 
and technocracy literature onto Saward’s framework of elective and non-elective 
claims, the third is more surprising. 
As might be anticipated, the parties founding Fischer’s government acted as makers 
of a representative claim stressed its temporary character of administration and limited 
role in bridging a short hiatus in normal (elected) party government. The inter-party 
agreement signed of  5 April 2009  thus spoke of an ‘interim government’ (překlenovácí 
vláda) of non-party experts’ leading the country to early elections, while outgoing prime 
minister Topolánek labelled it a ‘summertime government’.67 Politicians from parties 
that had created Fischer’s government stressed that it was legitimate as a product of 
normal democratic mechanisms: it was based on parties which had an electoral 
mandate and had formed using normal constitutional procedures, winning an 
unprecedentedly level of parliamentary support in the vote of confidence.68 The 
veteran Social Democrat politician Zdeněk Jičínský even went so far as to argue that 
the Fischer government was ‘an expression of the constitutional principle that the 
political system is based on the functioning of political parties’. The thinly veiled party 
affiliations of Fischer’s ministers were, in his view, a positive for the future development 
of party government, showing how ministers with different party backgrounds could 
govern calmly and co-operatively.69  Jičínský’s claim was, however, a relatively 
isolated one, indicating limits of elective claims that could be made for Fischer’s 
government, as direct co-operation of big parties in government was widely 
understood as cartel-like -  and hence illegitimate - negation of voter-party relationship. 
Politicians also large avoided the historically-derived term ‘government of officials’ 
(úřednická vláda) used to describe technocratic governments in interwar 
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Czechoslovakia which had (re-)entered common usage in both Czech media 
commentary and academic writing. Although it might have helped present technocratic 
administration – and the cross-party co-operation, which underlay it -  as part of an 
extended national tradition of party democracy, interwar governments of this type had 
governed without a parliamentary vote of confidence (not required under the 1920 
constitution) the analogy was not an attractive one for the parties who key 
representative claim was that Fischer’s caretaker government, although non-party in 
composition, was rooted in a parliamentary - and hence an electoral - majority.   
The representative claims Fischer made for his government were more technocratic 
in emphasis and he approached his appointment with the view that ‘… the job of prime 
minister is basically managerial’.70 Although was careful to note that his government 
was circumscribed and legitimised by its origins in an agreement between elected 
parties,  his government’s non-party and technocratic character and its ability to take 
some decisions independently of its supporting parties and the indirect electoral 
legitimacy they conferred. The government’s programmatic declaration of June 2009 
presented by Fischer to the Chamber of Deputies stressed not only that the 
government was ‘high-quality, non-partisan (nestranná) and politically neutral 
administration’, but also that 
 
Unlike standard political governments, it has been not formed by a coalition 
of political parties. It is formed of non-party experts and does not rest on a 
politically clearly defined, coalition majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 71 
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glossing over the fact that, while not dependent on a ‘clearly defined, coalition 
majority’ (my emphasis) his government was the product of an explicit written 
agreement between parties.   
Fischer added in the same statement that his government ‘was not only non-
partisan but adheres to the idea of being - in the good sense of the word – a 
technocratic government’.72 He did not elaborate on how technocracy was to be 
understood. However, a distinct, if weakly stated, set of technocratic 
representative claims can be identified. These mostly focused on the 
technocratic government’s ability to act in the deeper interests of society and its 
disinterestedness, rather than the expert status of its members. The 
programmatic declaration thus stressed it will be able to make ‘responsible’ and 
‘realistic’ decisions and to identify areas of well-established permanent national 
interest (for example, in foreign policy). The declaration also stressed the 
government’s ability to represent the whole of society by acting as a focal point 
and creator of social consensus by being ‘uniting rather than a dividing factor in 
Czech society’ in a time of austerity, by consulting more clearly and continuously 
with other representative bodies such as parties, president, interest groups than 
conventional party politicians could. 73  Fischer’s technocrat-led administration 
was portrayed as not merely playing a bridging role between conventional party 
governments, but as representing the whole of society offering, albeit it in limited 
areas, a distinct (and better) quality of governance.  
The non-elective technocratic claims made for Fischer’s self-styled technocratic 
administration were, thus, relatively modest, stressing technocrats’ 
disinterestedness from partisan politics, rather because of specialised 
governmental or administrative expertise of the type stressed in the technocracy 
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literature. Fischer later presented stronger, more sharply anti-party claims to 
technocratic claims after leaving office. In a memoir reflecting on his time as 
prime minister (representing himself to the Czech public as a future presidential 
candidate), he made clear that he saw he saw party politicians as poorly qualified 
to govern because they lived in an enclosed world and lacked relevant 
professional or life experience.   In one particularly revealing passage, recalling 
a conversation during his premiership with an unnamed business leader, he 
reflected on the possibility that a technocratic government might not be bound by 
a short-term interim role, but might be considered a more ‘normal’ state of affairs 
because party governments were ineffective at delivering sustained or coherent 
reforms.74   
 
Fischer as mirroring ‘ordinary Czechs’ 
The third and most surprising set of representative claims focused not on the 
technocratic status of Fischer and his ministers, but on how Fischer’s 
background outside the political class made him a culturally different type of (non-
)politician.  The makers of this claim appear to have been media commentators 
detectable whose representation of Fischer changed in late 2009, which sought 
to explain (but may itself have fed) his popularity. Having been initially lambasted 
in the media as lacking leadership qualities and experienced, Fischer was now 
depicted as a modest figure close in lifestyle and values to ordinary people who 
had triumphed as an anti-politician against the odds. Commentators now 
contrasted Fischer’s unflamboyant manner and dress favourably with those of 
overbearing party politicians. Weighing up Fischer’s premiership, the principal 
commentator of the biggest selling Czech newspaper MFDnes praised his 
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‘feeling and talent for politics’ concluding that he had “…shown that high office 
can be exercised competently, inventively, and unassumingly (nepapalášsky) 
with a human touch and a sense of humour”. 75  
Although Fischer was a well-connected member of the Czech administrative 
elite, whose life experience – which included regular access to cabinet meetings 
-  diverged sharply from that of vast majority of Czechs, journalistic profiles gave 
considerable space to stressing his stereotypical ordinariness of the prime 
minister mirrored that of ordinary people. One journalist, for example, 
characterised his lifestyle as 
 
 ‘... in no way different from the life of the average Czech. (..) Each morning he 
leaves his panel-built flat to walk the dog and, when his schedule permits, relaxes 
by going on weekend walks in the Krkonoš mountains. (...) for years he and his 
family have regularly gone for lunch... in an ordinary restaurant in a small Central 
Bohemian town near his small weekend home’. 
 
Although journalists were initially the makers of this claim, it was one that Fischer 
himself began to make, pointing out to interviewers his personal discomfort at using 
an official motorcade and sympathy for ordinary people inconvenienced by it, or 
relating how he taken a phone call from the White House in pyjamas in the 
surroundings of his modest panel-built flat.76 
The implicit representative claim in such portrayals depended not on a relationship to 
elected parties or the expertise conferred by membership of a disinterested 
administrative elite, but on  what Saward terms a “mirroring claim”: the  descriptive 
similarity between the claimant and the constituency he claims to speak for”.77 In this 
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construction, caretaker prime minister Fischer (subject) could claim to act legitimately 
act for ordinary Czechs (object) because he shared  and empathised with their tastes, 
lifestyle and values in ways that conventional party politicians (supposedly) did not. 
This portrayal of Fischer as an anti-political everyman - which ignored Fischer’s formal 
institutional role, experience or expertise  - echoes the classic populist construction of 
politics, both in sharply opposing the People and to a self-regarding elite of 
professional politicians and in presenting the authority of the leader as resting on 
authenticity, ordinariness and proximity to the People.78  
This is at first sight surprising. Populism and technocracy are widely seen as 
contradictory, albeit as in some senses ‘opposite sides of the same coin’.  As recent 
work in democratic theory highlights populist and technocratic claims shared an 
underlying critique of party-based democracy as distorting the realisation of the public 
interest and advocated an unmediated form of politics in which a trusted elite 
“discovers” this public interest – either through close identification with the People or 
specialist expertise.  There are, however, also significant differences. While populists 
see parties as unresponsive cabals serving vested or minority interests, technocratic 
critiques see parties as too focused on meeting voter demands and winning elections, 
resulting in ineffective policy-making and short-termism. 79 
However, viewed in terms of the representative claim-making framework, the 
juxtaposition of populist and technocratic claims is less surprising.  Representative 
claims are conceived not as ideological or programmatic statements, but as a dynamic 
series transient events, in which claims are made with varying degrees of strength or 
weakness; by different (sometimes competing) actors; and may be heard by different 
audiences. It is thus possible for a subject to accumulate and combine multiple 
representative claims. Indeed, what appears to have distinguished the Fischer 
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government most was its capacity to quickly take on a mix of elective and non-elective 
representative claims. The legitimacy of (different) representative claims cannot be 
fully assessed without considering the final stage in the process: their reception by 
audiences, both intended and unintended, and the ‘acts of acceptance’ that signal this 
legitimacy.80 This would require fine-grain qualitative data and the development a more 
systematic empirical methodologies for representative claims analysis extending to 
claims reception,81 taking into account underlying methodological difficulties 
measuring legitimacy.82 
 
Conclusions 
Since the onset of the Great Recession, technocratic caretaker governments have 
been a recurrent feature of several European democracies, sometimes governing for 
extended periods. However, despite varying levels of public support – which in the 
case of the Fischer administration were sustained at unusually high – the question of 
how they are legitimated to mass publics has remained largely unexamined.  This is 
especially the case given that technocratic caretaker administrations in post-1945 
European democracies have occurred in newer crisis-prone democracies in Eastern 
and Southern Europe, where the existence of credible non-partisan technocrats 
cannot be taken for granted.  These paradoxes are well  illustrated by the case of the 
Fischer administration in Czechia, whose supposedly ‘full technocratic’ cabinet of non-
party ministers concealed a complex raft of party-political affiliations and  careers 
straddling public administration and partisan politics.  
This paper has argued that the “representative claims”’ framework developed by 
Michael Saward can usefully be applied to study the legitimation of technocratic 
government, both because of its flexibility and as a corrective to the trend in the 
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literature to view technocratic governance solely through the prism of party 
government. Saward’s framework currently lends itself more to the empirical study of 
claims making, rather the reception of claims – and needs theoretically to be extended 
beyond positive representative claims to include critical claims intended to de-
legitimise, which were an important aspect of the politics of the the Fischer 
government. Despite these limitations, when applied to the case of the Fischer 
government, the representative claims framework highlights several important issues: 
1) that technocratic governments that, even where they occurred previously, are the 
subject to extensive representative claims-making and counter-claims making, 
triggering or reigniting wider debates about democratic representation (including party 
government); 2) that such the construction of representative bridge the gap between 
the ideal of impartial, non-partisan officialdom and the complex reality of party-state 
relations in newer democracies; 3) and that the technocratic label, technocratic 
governments will benefit from a mix of overlapping elective and non-elective claims, 
including novel ones such descriptive representation of the type made for Jan Fischer 
as an everyman anti-politician. 
The mix of representative claims identified around the Fischer should also warn us 
against slipping into a received understanding of technocratic governments as a 
stopgap device for established parties, likely to provoke an opposite reaction in the 
form of surging populist, anti-establishment parties. The Czech case suggests, that if 
technocratic governments such as Fischer’s are followed by a rise of anti-
establishment parties, it may be because they were similar to – and prefigure  - such 
parties, rather than being their polar opposite.  A  similar mix of claims -  electoral 
mandate, technocratic policies and ‘mirroring’ claims of a down-to-earth leader, 
coupled with  negative claim to be wholly unlike  traditional political party - underlies 
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the “managerial populism” of Andrej Babiš’s highly successful ANO movement, which 
broke into the Czech parliament in 2013.83  Elsewhere, the success of disruptive 
newcomers as diverse as Rafael Correa in Ecuador or Emmanuel Macron in France 
has been interpreted as a similar blend of technocratic and populist claims.84  
Finally we should note Fischer and other more popular ex-caretaker technocratic 
premiers such as Italy’s Mario Monti or Romania’s Cioloș  all of whom concluded that 
their brand of government should continue could be bolstered by a direct electoral 
mandate. Fischer (unsuccessfully) running for the Czech presidency in 2013, while 
Monti and Cioloș followed the template of a party-backed government of independent 
technocrats more closely, by running with electoral blocs of reformist parties promising 
some form of post-election continuation of their (as they believed, successful) 
technocratic administrations.  Saward’s framework, which views representation as 
multi-faceted, fluid and changeable and asks “to make democracy strange again”85, 
perhaps invites us to consider whether a democracy of teams of governing technocrats 
backed by parties might become a more prevalent form of democratic representation.  
In this sense, technocratic governments like that of Fischer may be  less interlopers to 
the democratic process, than interesting newcomers, whose arrival signals not simply 
crises to be managed but also opportunities to reconfigure democratic representation 
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